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ABSTRACT
Demand response (DR) is a cost-eective and environmentally
friendly approach for mitigating the uncertainties in renewable en-
ergy integration by taking advantage of the exibility of customers’
demands. However, existing DR programs suer from either low
participation due to strict commitment requirements or not being
reliable in voluntary programs. In addition, the capacity planning
for energy storage/reserves is traditionally done separately from
the demand response program design, which incurs ineciencies.
Moreover, customers oen face high uncertainties in their costs in
providing demand response, which is not well studied in literature.
is paper rst models the problem of joint capacity planning
and demand response program design by a stochastic optimization
problem, which incorporates the uncertainties from renewable en-
ergy generation, customer power demands, as well as the customers’
costs in providing DR. We propose online DR control policies based
on the optimal structures of the oine solution. A distributed al-
gorithm is then developed for implementing the control policies
without eciency loss. We further oer enhanced policy design by
allowing exibilities into the commitment level. We perform real
world trace based numerical simulations. Results demonstrate that
the proposed algorithms can achieve near optimal social costs, and
signicant social cost savings compared to baseline methods.
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1 INTRODUCTION
One of the major issues with the integration of renewable energy
sources into the power grid is the increased uncertainty and variabil-
ity that they bring [4]. e limited capability to accurately predict
this variability makes it challenging for the load serving entities
(LSEs) to respond to it [9]. If this variability is not suciently ad-
dressed, it will limit the further penetration of renewables into the
grid and even result in blackouts [11].
Various approaches have been implemented or proposed to ad-
dress this issue. ese include improving renewable generation fore-
cast [43], aggregating diverse renewable sources [53], fast-responding
reserve generators, energy storage [18, 26], and demand response
(DR) [47], among others. In particular, in 2013, the California state
legislature enforced a solution by passing a bill that requires 1,325
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MW of grid energy storage by 2020 [42, 46] and that declares “Ex-
panding the use of energy storage systems can assist … in inte-
grating increased amounts of renewable energy resources into the
electrical transmission and distribution grid” [46]. In order for this
solution to be cost-eective, the price of storage needs to be within
the range of $700-750/kWh. However, in 2013 when the law was
passed, prices were about three times that amount [45].
Compared to energy storage, demand response has advantages to
provide reserves to the LSEs in a cost-eective and environmentally
friendly way [28, 47]. Despite the great potential, there are cases
where the increase in the amount of reliable DR is much slower than
that of renewable integration [48], e.g. California’s move towards
more grid-level energy storage. ere are multiple reasons about
this, but the level of DR commitment is an important factor.
Roughly speaking, there are two types of DR programs based
on how much commitment customers need to make in the electric
load reduction. In the rst type, customers are required to make
full commitment in load reduction, e.g., regulations service [34],
capacity bidding [25]. As a result, it was hoped that the commied
demand response can be used as a “virtual” energy storage to the
power grid, and therefore signicantly reduce or at least delay the
purchase of additional energy storage. However, in such programs,
customers have to take all the responsibilities of managing their
uncertainties in meeting the hard commitment. As highlighted in
Section 2.1, customers actually face signicant uncertainties when
making their decisions, so it is not surprising that the participation
level in such commied programs is not high.
In the laer type, customers do not need to make any commit-
ments, and therefore are willing to participate in DR programs.
Examples include emergency demand response programs (NYISO
[40]) and coincident peak pricing [6]. e drawback, however, is
that from the LSE’s perspective this sort of “voluntary” demand
response is not reliable or suciently dispatchable. As a result, the
LSE still has to heavily rely on energy storage devices. Readers can
refer to Section 2 for more background information.
e tradeo between commitment levels and reliability of de-
mand response raises the following question: how can we eec-
tively incentivize the amount of reliable demand response?
is paper moves towards answering this question by making the
following main contributions:
(1) We model the social cost minimization problem using stochastic
optimization, and characterize the optimal solution in Sections 3
and 4. ere are two novel features in our stochastic optimiza-
tion model. First, the uncertainties on the customers’ costs to
provide DR are explicitly modeled. Second, the capacity plan-
ning for the amount of energy storage/reserve needed is jointly
optimized with the demand response program design.
(2) Motivated by the optimal structures of the oine solution, we
propose simple contracts between customers and LSE and cor-
responding DR control policies, namely, PRED and LIN, in Sec-
tion 5. ese contracts incentivize customers to participate in
DR by oering payments larger than their associated costs. We
further design a distributed algorithm with guaranteed con-
vergence to overcome the challenge in LIN that LSE may not
have enough information about customers’ cost functions, so
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Figure 1: ForHomesA, B, and C: (a) Load (kW) trace in ve-minute intervals fromMay 6-8, 2012, (b) Cumulative distribution of
the ve-minute loads (kW) of the 33 days along with themeans (dashed lines). (c) Heatmap showing the correlation coecient
matrix for one day of loads from 395 buildings.
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Figure 2: (a) e ISO-NE load mismatch (MW) between real-time load and day-ahead provisioned load for the Western Mas-
sachusetts zone, and the real-time market price from May 23-29, 2012. For the same data during a period of 33 days: (b)
Cumulative distribution functions for the load mismatch of ISO-NE, and real-time price, (c) Heatmap showing the correlation
coecient matrix for of loads from homes A, B, C, the load mismatch of ISO-NE, and real-time price.
that the policy remains practical in this case. To fully respect
and also exploit customer uncertainties, we introduce exible
commitment levels into LIN by allowing limited violation of the
contract in Section 6.3.
(3) Using real world traces, we evaluate and demonstrate the bene-
ts of our proposed contracts/control policies in Sections 6. Our
study demonstrates that a) it is essential to take into account
the customers’ uncertainties into DR program design, and b) op-
timizing capacity provisioning jointly with DR program design
reduces social cost signicantly. In particular, the following key
insights are obtained:
• Simple control policies as we proposed can perform closely
to the a-posteriori optimum, and greatly outperform bench-
marks similar to the current practice.
• e required amount of energy storage/reserve capacity can
be signicantly reduced due to deeper extraction of DR re-
sources.
• Optimizing exible commitment levels takes into account
customer uncertainties even beer, and can further reduce
the social cost to almost its fundamental limit (a-posteriori
optimum). Moreover, as it brings benets to both the cus-
tomers and the LSE, both sides are incentivized to participate
in the program.
2 BACKGROUND
In this section, we rst demonstrate customers’ uncertainties as
well as the uncertainties that LSEs experience by investigating real
world load and power market data. We then provide an overview
of existing demand response programs categorized based on their
levels of commitment. Namely, there are two major categories: fully
commied DR programs, voluntary DR programs, as well as other
programs in between such as voltage regulation services [1]. We
then discuss the advantages and drawbacks of these DR programs
in the context of customers with signicant uncertainties.
2.1 Customer Uncertainties
We analyze the Smart∗ Data Set obtained from the University of
Massachuses Trace Repository [14] to demonstrate customer con-
sumption uncertainties. e specic data we use include the load
data from three dierent homes located in Western Massachuses
given in one-second intervals from 33 days between May 1, 2012
through June 11, 2012, as well as the loads of another 395 buildings
for one complete day. We average them into ve-minute intervals
and use these for our trace-based numerical studies. Five-minute
intervals is the data granularity required by the ISO-NE [32] which
is common among other DR programs [27]. A concurrent three
day sample of the three homes is given in Figure 1(a), which shows
peak loads are non-overlapping in many cases. Figure 1(b) displays
the empirical cumulative distribution function of the three homes
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Figure 3: Hourly wind power data taken from the ISO-NE for
the same dates as the UMass Homes: A one-week sample of
the trace is given along with the empirical cumulative distri-
bution of all 51 days.
over the 33 days along with their means. e large peak-to-mean
ratios indicate the signicant uncertainties in customers energy
consumptions.
Furthermore, it is observed that customers’ loads are only weakly
correlated, if at all. e northwest corner of Figure 2(c) shows a
heatmap of the correlation matrix between the three homes which
exhibits very lile correlation. Similarly, for the loads of the other
395 buildings, a heatmap of the correlation matrix between 395
buildings is shown in Figure 1(c) which gives evidence that most
customers have loads which are only weakly correlated.
2.2 Load Serving Entity Uncertainties
We analyze the following data from the ISO New England for the
Western Massachuses load zone [8] to demonstrate the market
uncertainties LSE experience in their daily operation. e specic
data is given in one-hour intervals of the real-time total load, load
contracted in the day-ahead market, and the real-time market price
for the same days as the previously described customer data. We
calculate the real-time load mismatch of supply and demand as
the dierence between the real-time load and day-ahead market
provisioned load. Figure 2(a) displays a one week sample of the
load mismatch and its corresponding real-time price. e empirical
cumulative distribution functions of the load mismatch and the
real-time price for the 33 days are shown in Figure 2(b). e high
peak-to-mean ratios indicate signicant uncertainties in the load
mismatch and prices that LSEs need to handle in real time. In
addition, the southeast corner of Figure 2(c) shows that they are
weakly correlated over the sampled 33 days.
2.3 A Dichotomy of Existing DR Programs
Existing DR programs in the current practice can be categorized by
the commitment levels of the program participants. Most DR pro-
grams either demand the participants to fully commit to responding
to DR signals, or allow the participants to not respond without any
penalty at all. In what we refer to as fully commied DR programs,
customers must respond to DR signals, and have to pay penalties
if they fail to do so. Examples include CAISO BIP (Base Interrupt-
ible Program) [2], ERCOT ERS (Emergency Response Service) [5],
and NYISO SCR (Special Case Resources) [10]. On the other hand
we refer to voluntary DR programs as ones whose customers only
voluntarily respond to DR signals in which ignoring DR signals is
penalty-free. Examples include ERCOT VLR (Voluntary Load Re-
sponse) [5], NYISO EDRP (Emergency Demand Response Program)
[10], and CAISO DBP (Demand Bidding Program) [3].
In between these two extremes with regard to customer com-
mitment are voltage regulation services programs (e.g. PJM voltage
regulation services [1, 23]) which have relatively high payments
for their fast control speed to follow a signal from the LSE [12, 24].
e most interesting part of regulation services programs is the
exibility in them which motivates our LIN+(ρ) program described
in Section 6.3. Instead of requiring customers to strictly follow the
signal, there is a predened violation frequency limit (100 − ρ)%,
i.e., customers can violate the signal up to (100 − ρ)% of the time.
erefore, customers do not need to pay the high penalty even if
they have some violations from the signal, as long as the probabil-
ity of violation is below the predened level. Intuitively, this can
economically help the customers who may accidentally face high
costs of DR and decide not to follow the signals.
2.4 Challenges of Customer Uncertainties
We end this section by highlighting the advantages and drawbacks of
dierent commitment levels of DR programs. For a fully commied
DR program, a) it has the advantage of providing guarantees to the
LSE in geing the expected DR responses, but b) as such, it does
not provide any exibility to the participating customers in all but
responding to DR signals, even though they may unexpectedly face
a diculty in real time in responding. For a voluntary DR program,
a) it has the advantage that the customers are protected from their
risks of having diculty to respond to DR signals, but b) the LSE
has a hard time of geing any reliability guarantees of the DR they
get from such programs.
As a result, fully commied DR programs tend to enlist an insu-
cient amount of guaranteed DRs because customers are less willing
to sign up due to their inherent uncertainties. On the other hand,
voluntary DR programs face a similar consequence but for a dier-
ent reason: it’s hard for them to obtain guaranteed DRs because
customers can freely ignore any DR signals.
Recently, third-party curtailment service providers (CSPs) and
aggregators pooling together DR from several customers emerge as
a promising opportunity [44]. Our work can be viewed as a solution
for CSPs and aggregators to lessen DR commitment uncertainties.
For instance, the optimization problem and proposed algorithms
can be adopted by CSPs and aggregators to allocate DR to their
customers in a more eective way.
3 MODEL
We consider a discrete-time model with time step duration nor-
malized to 1, such that price and demand changes can be updated
within a time slot. ere is a (possibly long) interval of interest
t ∈ {1, 2, ...,T }, whereT can be one month, one year or even longer.
Each timeslot represents the time needed to make changes to de-
mand, which can be 5 minutes. is timescale is consistent with
similar DR approaches as in [17, 30].
ere is an LSE who wishes to procure a total amount D of load
change. is can be load reduction as usual, and has the additional
generalizability to handle the case for load increase when too much
renewable energy is generated and/or customers demand is lower
than predicted. e LSE serves a set of customers indexed by i ∈
{1, 2, ...,N }. We ignore the power network constraints in this paper.
However, our model and algorithms can be extended with extra
eort to incorporate those power network constraints. In particular,
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in a power distribution network, the exact convex relaxation and
convexication [38] can be applied to make the problem convex.
erefore the approach proposed in this paper can be applied.
Customers
Let di (t) be the total power demand of the appliances controlled
by customer i at time t . To model the power demand uncertainty for
customers we let di (t) be a random variable with lower and upper
bounds di and di respectively. e LSE will predict customers’ de-
mand to purchase power beforehand, e.g., in the day-ahead market.
We denote by dˆi (t) the predicted power consumption of customer i
at time t .
In the real time, customer i observes its own real power demand
di (t) in the absence of a DR program and decides by xi (t) under
a particular DR program as the amount of demand change from
di (t). Here we use a positive xi (t) as reduction, and a negative
value implies demand increase. So the actual power consumption
is di (t) − xi (t). Essentially, we are using the actual consumption as
the baseline to measure DR. Dierent baseline models can easily
be incorporated with additional complexity. Determining customer
baselines for demand response is an active area of research [49].
To model the loss of utility caused by the change in power con-
sumption xi (t) from the original demand di (t), we assume there
is a cost function Ci (xi (t); t). e function is inherently dierent
for dierent timeslots. For instance, the customer may have some
emergency tasks to nish at some timeslot, so changing the load
is costly for that particular t . It is not necessary for the change in
demand to be instantaneous and the ramping time would be deter-
mined by the specic DR program. ere are newly developed DR
recommender systems (e.g. DR-Advisor [15]) that can be used by
homeowners to manage DR commitments.
As usual, we make the following mild assumption about the
customer’s cost/disutility function:
Assumption 1. ∀i,∀t , Ci (·; t) is convex and dierentiable with
Ci (0; t) = 0 and C ′i (0; t) = 0.
Under this assumption, if the customers are le to decide their
power consumption themselves without any demand response pro-
gram, each customer will choose to consume at their power demand
di (t), i.e., xi (t) = 0. e convexity assumption is consistent with
the concavity assumption of customer utility functions as was done
in [17, 33, 36, 51].
In reality, this cost function may not be known until at (or just
before) the time of consumption. In some cases, the LSE needs to
estimate the customers cost functions to set the appropriate price
for demand response payment. Here, we assume that Assumption 1
also applies to the estimated customer cost function Cˆi (xi ; t).
A simple but widely used example is the quadratic function, i.e.,
Ci (xi (t); t) = ai (t)xi (t)2 which is explored further in Section 4.2.
e uncertainty of the function is therefore represented by the
randomness in its parameter ai (t). While simple, quadratic cost
functions are widely used in electricity market literature [13, 22, 37,
39, 50].
Load Serving Entity
We consider the general case where the LSE has volatile renew-
able energy generation that must be used when it is produced. e
generation at time t is denoted by a random variable r (t) bounded
between r and r .
e LSE procures power beforehand according to its estimation
on customers’ demand
∑
i dˆi (t) and renewable generations rˆ (t) for
timeslot t . We assume the procurement is
∑
i dˆi (t) − rˆ (t), while our
model and approaches can be easily extended to handle other form
of procurement.
Aer the power procurement, LSE is responsible for balancing
in real time the power demand, which is the aggregate customer
power consumption
∑
i di (t) and the power supply, which consists
of both the power procured beforehand, e.g.,
∑
i dˆi (t) − rˆ (t) plus the
available renewable power r (t).
erefore, the demand response goal is to clear the mismatch
due to prediction errors, i.e.,
D(t) =
∑
i
di (t) −
∑
i
(dˆi (t) − rˆ (t) + r (t))
=
∑
i
(di (t) − dˆi (t)) − (r (t) − rˆ (t)).
We denote by δi (t) := di (t) − dˆi (t) and δr (t) := r (t) − rˆ (t) the
prediction errors for customer i’s demand and the renewable gener-
ation, respectively.
en
D(t) =
∑
i
δi (t) − δr (t).
In many cases, the LSE cannot get exactlyD(t) amount of demand
response, and has to bear the cost denoted by the penalty function
Cд(∆(t)), where ∆(t) = D(t) − ∑i xi (t). Specically, this is the
cost imposed on the LSE to close the gap through actions such as
employing fast responding reserves or grid energy storage. We note
that the cost of reducing some of the mismatch via hour-ahead (or
other near-real-time) power market interactions can be incorporated
in Cд(∆(t)). Again, we make the following mild assumption:
Assumption 2. Cд(·) is convex and dierentiable with Cд(0) = 0
and C ′д(0) = 0.
is convexity assumption for the LSE’s cost was also made
[33, 36].
In order for the LSE to tolerate the mismatch and prevent black-
outs, the LSE must purchase long-term energy storage or reserves
in some forward market denoted by κ. is gives us the mismatch
constraint1:
−κ ≤ ∆(t) ≤ κ,∀t . (1)
Notice that LSE’s decision for the capacity κ is constant for all
t ∈ {1, 2, ...,T } where the time horizon T is can be set to the time
for deciding the capacity, e.g. a day, month, etc. Denote Ccap(κ)
as the cost of the energy storage/reserve capacity κ amortized to
the duration of interests T . Again, we make the following mild
assumption:
Assumption 3. Ccap(·) is increasing, convex and dierentiable.
For instance,Cд(·) can be a quadratic function A∆(t)2, andCk (κ)
can be linear cκ. While simple, quadratic cost functions are widely
used in generation cost modeling [29, 31, 41].
Optimization Problem
e expected social cost can be represented by
Ccap(κ) + Eδ,δr ,Ci (·)
[∑
t
[∑
i
Ci (xi (t); t) +Cg
(
D(t) −
∑
i
xi (t)
)]]
.
where we assume that the randomness in customers’ cost function
Ci (·; t) and the mismatch D(t) are stationary. is assumption is
reasonable since the randomness in D(t) is due to the prediction
error of the customers’ load demands and renewable energy sup-
ply. Additionally, this assumption is intuitive for customers whose
underlying load preference behavior does not change signicantly
within the time horizon T . erefore, we can remove the time
dependencies and simplify the expected social cost to:
1is constraint can be generalized to the case where the upper and lower bounds are
function of κ , and our approaches apply with lile change.
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Ccap(κ) + Eδ,δr ,Ci (·)
[∑
i
Ci (xi ) +Cg
(
D −
∑
i
xi
)]
(2)
where Ccap(κ) is amortized to a single timeslot.
e goal is therefore to decide the capacity planning κ and a
practical policy x(δ ,δr ) simultaneously to optimize the expected
social cost (2).
min
κ,x(δ,δr )
Ccap(κ)
+ Eδ,δr ,Ci (·)
[∑
i
Ci (xi (δi ,δr )) +Cg
(
D −
∑
i
xi (δi ,δr )
)]
s.t. max
δ,δr
{
D −
∑
i
xi (δi ,δr )
}
≤ κ (3a)
min
δ,δr
{
D −
∑
i
xi (δi ,δr )
}
≥ −κ . (3b)
We note that (3a) and (3b) are worst-case constraints. To optimize
the policy is known to be challenging, so we rst provide the upper
and lower bound to this optimization.
Upper bound: SEQ
e upper bound is the two-stage policy used widely in practice
which rst obtains capacity assuming the worst-case mismatch due
to prediction error and then sets a price on voluntary DR. We call it
“SEQ” in this paper to highlight it optimizes sequentially instead of
simultaneously. In the rst stage, SEQ performs capacity planning
to obtain κ by solving the following optimization problem:
min
κ
Ccap(κ) (4)
s.t. max
δ,δr
{D} ≤ κ
min
δ,δr
{D} ≥ −κ
en in real-time, SEQ sets price to extract demand response
from customers. is is to mimic the voluntary demand response
programs such as NYISO EDRP.
Formally, SEQ works as:
SEQ:
• Solve (4) to get κSEQ for capacity planning;
• In real time, pick a functionp(D;κSEQ ) to decide the demand
response payment price p when observing a mismatch D.
Note how to pick the function highly depends on the experience
and expertise of the LSE stas. In Section 5, we propose a data-
driven approach to obtain p(D).
Lower bound: OFFLINE
A lower bound on the minimum social cost is given by the
oine/a-posteriori optimal solution. Specically, the oine opti-
mum is given by the following:
min
κ
Ccap(κ) + Eδ,δr minx(t )
{∑
i
Ci (xi (t); t) +Cg
(
D(t) −
∑
i
xi (t)
)}
s.t. − κ ≤ D(t) −
∑
i
xi (t) ≤ κ, for each realization t . (5a)
Note that, the minimization over x(t) is performed inside the
expectation, meaning that it is performed aer observing the real-
izations of the random variables. is results in the fact that the
oine optimum can never be beaten by any online policy x(δi ,δr ).
Formally, OPT works as:
OPT:
• Solve (5) to get κ∗ for capacity planning;
• In real time, solve the inner minimization over x(t) in (5) to
get x∗(t).
4 CHARACTERIZING THE OPTIMA
In this section, we provide the characterization of the optimal so-
lution to reveal special structures that we take advantage of in our
algorithm design (Section 5). We start with the convexity of the
problem followed by a concrete case study of the necessary and
sucient conditions of the optimal solution.
4.1 Convexity
e rst key result regarding the problem is the convexity, as stated
formally in eorem 4.1. e convexity is crucial for our proposed
algorithm in Section 5.
Theorem 4.1. (5) is a convex optimization problem over κ.
Proof. e result follows from Assumption 3 and Lemma 4.3
given below. 
e proof requires the following lemmas and we restate the real-
time decision (i.e. inside the expectation) of Problem (5) as:
R(κ; t) := min
x(t )
{∑
i
Ci (xi (t); t) +Cg
(
D(t) −
∑
i
xi (t)
)}
(6a)
s.t. − κ ≤ D(t) −
∑
i
xi (t) ≤ κ . (6b)
Lemma 4.2. Problem (6) is a convex optimization problem.
Proof. is comes straightforward from Assumptions 1 and 2,
that the function inside Cд(·) is linear, and the constraints form a
convex set. 
Lemma 4.3. R(κ; t) as dened by (6) is a convex function of κ.
Additionally the negative of the sum of dual variables θ + θ from
constraint (6b) is the subgradient of R(κ; t) w.r.t. κ.
Proof. Since (6) is a convex optimization problem (from Lemma
4.2), the result follows from the fact that Problem (6) is in a perturbed
form in terms of κ which can be used to follow standard sensitivity
analysis (See Section 5.6.1 in [21]). 
4.2 Case study: quadratic cost functions
To provide more optimal structures, we restrict ourselves to the qua-
dratic cost functions, i.e. Ci (x) = aix2i and Cд(x) = A(D −
∑
i xi )2.
eir key advantageous property is that have linear marginal costs
which allow for more concrete analysis and motivate the linear
decision policy (Section 5.2). Note this may seem restrictive, but
this form is standard within the electricity markets literature, e.g.,
[13, 22, 37, 39, 50] and generation cost modeling [29, 31, 41].
en the oine optimization problem in real-time without ca-
pacity constraints2 becomes:
min
x

∑
i
aix
2
i +A
(
D −
∑
i
xi
)2
By the rst-order stationary conditions from the Karush-Kuhn-
Tucker (KKT) conditions (See Appendix A for the general case), we
have
2is can be added with additional presentation complexity.
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aixi = A(D −
∑
j
x j ), so xi = A
ai
(D −
∑
j
x j )
Sum over all i gives:∑
i
xi =
(∑
i
A
ai
)
(D −
∑
i
xi ), so
∑
i
xi =
∑
i
A
ai
1 +
∑
i
A
ai
D
Finally, we have x∗i =
A(
1+
∑
j
A
aj
)
ai
D, which is linear to the social
mismatch D. is property is crucial to help us design the linear
policy. is approach is general and can be applied to more com-
plicated cost functions. e dierence is that the optimal structure
would be more complicated, and so would the policy.
5 ALGORITHMS
In this section, we design two algorithms/control policies for DR,
namely, “PRED” and “LIN”. PRED is the prediction based policy
with no contracts, and is hence a voluntary program. LIN relies
on a linear demand response contract between LSE and customers,
and is hence a mandatory program: it, however, respects customer
uncertainties as will be shown later in this section. For presentation
simplicity, we omit the t and will highlight it wherever needed.
5.1 Prediction Based Policy
Ideally, the LSE would like to set a price for demand response and
obtain an amount that would optimally solve Problem (6). is in
turn would allow Problem (5) of nding the optimal capacity to be
solved.
In general however, the customer cost functions Ci (xi (t); t) and
the instantaneous customer load deviations δi (t) are not known by
the LSE. Despite this, from historical data of past customer responses
to prices, the LSE can estimate their cost functions denoted by
Cˆi (xi (t); t) with some inaccuracies.
From a privacy perspective, customers may not be willing to
share their detailed load data due to the information that can be
inferred from it. However, customers can hide some of their private
information by recently proposed mechanism, e.g., using baeries
to add randomness to their consumptions [35, 52].
First, the LSE utilizes the historical data to solve a (determinis-
tic) optimization problem about how to set the price for demand
response, i.e., p(D;κ) for a given κ. For a given κ it optimizes:
H (κ;D) := min
p
{∑
i
Cˆi (xi (p)) +Cg
(
D −
∑
i
xi (p)
)}
(7)
s.t. − κ ≤ D −
∑
i
xi (p) ≤ κ .
We abuse the notation of xi (·) as xi (p) = arg min Cˆi (xi ) − pxi to
represent a customer’s demand response given a particular price p.
To nd the optimal amount of capacity κ, it must solve
min
κ
Ccap(κ) + Eδ,δr [H (κ;D)] (8)
which may be done by exhaustive search for the best κ. Once κ is
xed, then the optimal solution to (7) gives a price function p(D;κ).
is price function is then applied in real-time to obtain demand
response from all the customers. Under certain conditions, such as
quadratic and/or linear cost functions, a closed form of p(D;κ) can
be obtained.
Formally, PRED works as follows:
PRED:
• Using historical date to solve (7) to get p(D;κ);
• Solve (8) to get κPRED for capacity planning;
• In real time, when observing D, set price p(D;κPRED ).
PRED is intuitive and works well when the uncertainties onCi (·)
are small, as illustrated in the numerical evaluations in Section 6.
is makes PRED an aractive solution in many cases. For instance,
in the emergency demand response program, the LSE sets the price
based on their knowledge and experience, which corresponds to the
predicted p(D;κ) in our PRED scheme. We would like to highlight
that by proposing PRED, we are making two improvements over
existing schemes. First, we provide a rigorous procedure to get
p(D;κ) by looking into historical data and solving an optimization
problem. Second, we jointly solve κ and p(D;κ), instead of geing
them sequentially in SEQ.
However, its performance greatly depends on the estimation
accuracy of the cost functions, and degrades as the uncertainties
increase. To see this, note that the LSE needs to pickp(D;κ) based on
some sort of “averaged” customers’ cost functions, without knowing
the exact realization ofCi (·; t). WhenCi (·; t) has more uncertainties,
the response xi (p,Ci (·; t)) from customers based on the realized
Ci (·; t) may be farther away from the value expected by the LSE.
5.2 Linear policy
Motivated by the potential ineciency of PRED when uncertainties
are large, we design a linear policy, “LIN”, as the contract between
LSE and customers.
In general, we can take the following nonlinear form of a cus-
tomer demand response policy:
xi (δi ,D) = αi fi (D) + βiдi (δi ) + γi (9)
where fi (D) is a function of net aggregate mismatch D, and дi (δi )
is function of the local demand mismatch. is structure is rich
enough for the demand change to be responsive to the net society
mismatch through αi fi (D), local self mismatch through βiдi (δi ),
and an independent reduction of γi .
While the above form is general and powerful, there are two
concerns around it. First of all, in addition to the parameter αi , βi ,γi ,
we need to optimize over the function form fi (·) and дi (·), which is
very challenging, if not impossible. More importantly, customers
may not be willing to accept contracts in a very complicated form.
Based on these considerations, we restrict our aentions to the
following linear policy, and show that this policy works very well in
many cases, in particular, when cost functions are quadratic. How to
decide the optimal fi (·) and дi (·) for general convex cost functions
is our future work.
We now focus on a simple but powerful linear demand response
policy that is a function of total and local net demands:
xi (δi ) = αiD + βiδi + γi . (10)
Intuitively, there are three components: αiD implies each cus-
tomer shares some (predened) fraction of the global mismatch D;
βiδi means customer i may need to take additional responsibility
for the mismatch due to his own demand uctuation and estima-
tion error; nally, γi , the constant part, can help when the random
variables E[D] and/or E[δi ] is nonzero. In fact, this linear policy is
optimal for the case of quadratic cost functions which can be seen
in Section 4.2.
en the LSE needs to solve the following optimization problem
to obtain the optimal parameters for the linear contract, i.e., α , β ,γ ,
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as well as the optimal capacity κ:
min
α ,β,γ,κ
Ccap (κ) +
∑
i
Eδi ,δr ,Ci [Ci (αiD + βiδi + γi )]
+ Eδ,δr
[
Cg
(
D −
∑
i
(αiD + βiδi + γi )
)]
(11)
s.t. (3a), (3b)
e expectation can be separated by customer and LSE because
of the linearity of expectation property.
Theorem 5.1. Problem (11) is a convex optimization problem.
Proof. e objective function is convex in (α , β,γ ) because
the expectation operator preserves convexity, the cost functions
are convex from Assumptions 1-3, and the arguments inside each
cost function are linear in (α , β ,γ ) for each realization of (δi ,δr )
which preserve convexity. By substituting the linear policy (10) into
constraints (3a), (3b) it forms a convex set because the point-wise
maximum (minimum) operator preserves convexity (concavity), and
the arguments inside the operators are linear in (α , β,γ ) for each
realization of (δi ,δr ) which preserve convexity (concavity). e
result follows from the objective function being convex and the
constraint set forming a convex set. 
Since Problem (11) is a convex optimization problem and is also
stochastic, it can be solved centrally with standard stochastic op-
timization techniques such as the Stochastic Subgradient Method
with Monte Carlo sampling where one simulates a sample of (δi ,δr )
and solves the problem via the dual variables by taking a step in
the direction of the dual variables’ subgradient . As the number of
iterations approaches innity, then the dual variables approach their
optimal values [19]. If the cost functions are quadratic and/or linear
then only the rst and second moments of δi and δr are needed to
make (11) into a deterministic convex optimization problem.
Formally, LIN works as:
LIN:
• Solve (11) to get κLIN for capacity planning and the param-
eters (α ∗, β∗,γ∗);
• In real time, customer i needs to provide demand response
xi (t) = α∗i D(t) + β∗i δi (t) + γ ∗i when observing D(t).
5.3 Distributed algorithm design
In many cases, the LSE may not know the information about cus-
tomers’ cost functions, and cannot solve (11) for the parameters in
the linear contract. To handle this, we design the distributed algo-
rithm to decompose the problem, so that each customer solves an op-
timization problem based on her own cost function, and LSE solves
another optimization problem without knowing the customers’ cost
function. e goal is to achieve the optimal (κLIN ,α ∗, β∗,γ∗).
To decompose Problem (11) we use the auxiliary variables (ui ,vi ,wi )
for (αi , βi ,γi ) in the estimated cost function Cˆi (·) of each customer,
and add the constraints that ui = αi , vi = βi , and wi = γi :
min
α ,β,γ,u,v,w,κ
Ccap (κ) +
∑
i
Eδ,δr
[
Cˆi (uiD +viδi +wi )
]
+ Eδ,δr
[
Cg
(∑
i
(δi − αiD − βiδi − γi ) − δr
)]
s.t. (3a), (3b) (12a)
ui = αi , vi = βi , wi = γi , ∀i ∈ V (12b)
Problem (12) can be split where each customer controls its own
(ui ,vi ,wi ) and the LSE controls (α , β,γ ) from the dual decomposi-
tion of constraint (12b). Let (pii , λi , µi ) be the dual prices for each
customer corresponding to constraint (12b) which result in the fol-
lowing meanings: µi is the price paid for the guaranteed reduction
in power consumption wi by the customer, pii is the price paid for
absorbing the fraction ui of the net aggregate system demand D, λi
is the price paid for absorbing the fraction vi of its own local net
demand δi . erefore piiui + λivi + µiwi is the total payment to
customer i for following the linear demand response policy.
Accordingly, (11) is decomposed as the individual customer opti-
mization problem,
min
ui ,vi ,wi
Eδ,δr
[
Cˆi (uiD +viδi +wi )
] − piiui − λivi − µiwi (13)
and the LSE’s optimization problem,
min
α ,β,γ,κ
Ccap (κ) +
∑
i
(piiαi + λiβi + µiγi )
+ Eδ,δr
[
Cg
(∑
i
(δi − αiD − βiδi − γi ) − δr
)]
(14)
s.t. (3a), (3b)
which both can be solved with standard stochastic optimization
techniques such as the Stochastic Subgradient Method with Monte
Carlo sampling [19]. With linear or quadratic cost functions, they in
fact can be solved as a deterministic convex optimization problem
with only the rst and second order moments of δ and δr . e
goal now becomes to nd the optimal dual prices to ensure the
customers’ and LSE’s decisions satisfy (12b). We achieve this by
using the Subgradient Method (see [16] Chapter 6):
Distributed Algorithm for LIN:
(0) Initialization: (α , β,γ , u, v,w,pi ,λ, µ) := 0.
(1) LSE: receives (ui ,vi ,wi ) from each customer i ∈ V .
• Solves Problem (14) and updates (α , β ,γ ) with the
optimal solution.
• Updates the stepsize:
η =
ζ /k
| |(α , β,γ ) − (u, v,w)| |2 (15)
where ζ is a small constant and k is the iteration
number.
• Updates the dual prices, ∀i ∈ V:
(pii , λi , µi ) := (pii , λi , µi ) + η ((αi , βi , γi ) − (ui , vi , wi )) (16)
• Sends (pii , λi , µi ) to the each customer respectively.
(2) Customer i ∈ V: receives (pii , λi , µi ) from LSE.
• Solves Problem (13) and updates (ui ,vi ,wi ) with
optimal solution.
• Sends (ui ,vi ,wi ) to the LSE.
(3) Repeat Steps 1-2 until | |(α , β,γ ) − (u, v,w)| |2 ≤ ϵ where
ϵ is the tolerance on magnitude of the subgradient.
Since the step size η is non-summable, square summable, and
diminishes to zero, the algorithm will converge to an equilibrium
point. en the nal agreed values are α := u, β := v,γ := w last
sent by the customers, and the dual prices are (pi ,λ, µ) last sent
by the LSE. When the LSE signals the customers for DR and they
respond accordingly, they will each be paid piiui + λivi + µiwi .
We now prove the convergence and optimality using two mild
technical conditions:
Assumption 4. e distance between the rst iteration of the dis-
tributed algorithm and the optimal dual prices has a nite upper
bound: | |Λ(1) − Λ∗ | |2 ≤ Λ < ∞.
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Figure 4: (a) Demand mismatch for the 300 customers along
with 100 kWof wind power capacity used in the simulations;
(b) Cumulative distribution for the demand mismatch.
Assumption 5. e magnitude of the dual subgradient G has a
nite upper bound: | |G | |2 ≤ G < ∞ (i.e. the Lagrangian dual function
is Lipschitz continuous).
Theorem 5.2. Given Assumptions 4 and 5, the distributed algo-
rithm’s trajectory of dual prices converge to the optimal dual prices.
e proof has been relegated to Appendix B.
6 PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
We compare our proposed algorithms PRED and LIN with two
baselines: the oine optimal solution OPT as the lower bound for
social cost and the sequential algorithm SEQ as the upper bound.
6.1 Experimental Setup
We aim to use realistic parameters in the experimental setup to
evaluate the performance of our proposed algorithms, and to under-
stand the solution properties of each algorithm. We model an LSE
supplying power to 300 customers with a demand response timeslot
that is ve minutes long.
e LSE rst purchases capacity for which we model the cost as
a linear function cκ with the parameter c ∈ $[0.01, 50]/kW-mo to
cover a broad range of grid capacity type costs and amortized storage.
e generation cost function for the LSE is modeled as a quadratic
functionA (D −∑i xi )2 with the parameterA = $0.1/122/kW2. For
this cost function seing, a deviation of 60kW for ve minutes is
equivalent to an energy cost of $0.50/kWh and matches the intuition
that larger mismatches are increasingly more expensive to manage.
To model each customer’s particular load demand, we utilize
the traces obtained from the UMass Trace Repository which give
very granular load measurements from three homes (cf. Figure 1(b)
for cumulative distributions) [14]. To make more accurate general
conclusions we need more customers’ load data. However, the focus
of this evaluation is to compare the performance of the dierent
algorithms presented and demonstrate how to employ customer
data to them. We model the cost incurred by each customer to
change its consumption as a quadratic cost aix2i with the param-
eter ai ∈ $[1, 10]/122kW2. Under these seings, a consumption
decrease of 0.3kW for ve minutes would cost the customer an
energy price equivalent to $0.025-0.25/kWh. To generate customer
cost uncertainties we rst randomly choose a˜i from a bounded nor-
mal distribution. Each a˜i is used as a mean to further generate the
training and test sets separately from a bounded normal distribution.
e aˆi approximated by the LSE is then formed by averaging the
training set values for customer i .
Renewable generation is incorporated into our simulations by
using the ISO-NE’s data on hourly wind power production for the
same dates as the UMass data [7]. A week-long sample and cumula-
tive distribution for all the data are shown in Figure 3. e capacity
is set to 100kW by default, while we vary it in the sensitivity analy-
sis. e training and test sets for which we have trace data (Homes
A,B,C and ISO-NE wind production) were made by rst randomly
separate each trace into a raw training and raw test set. For each set
we generate customer traces by bootstrapping 100 customers from
each of the UMass Homes A/B/C. We also do this for the ISO-NE
wind data which is rst normalized by the maximum power output
so that we can scale wind power. e demand mismatch D over two
days and the corresponding CDF are depicted in Figure 4.
6.2 Performance evaluation
e evaluation of our algorithms and the cost savings will be orga-
nized around the following topics.
Convergence of the distributed algorithm. We start by considering
the convergence of our distributed algorithm for LIN. Figure 5(a)
illustrates that the social cost of the distributed algorithm converges
quickly to that of the centralized algorithm which validates the
convergence analysis of eorem 5.2. For the parameters, even if
we start with αi = 0, it quickly converges to the optimal αi which
are dierent among customers as they have dierent parameters,
i.e., ai in their cost functions. For the other LIN parameters, γi and
βi stay at zero across all customers since the optimal γi = 0 for zero-
mean deviations and optimal βi = 0 for quadratic cost functions.
us, the remaining plots show only the centralized algorithm.
How well do PRED and LIN perform? We move to this key ques-
tion of the evaluation. To evaluate the benets in terms of social
cost savings for our algorithms, Figure 6 compares the social cost
of PRED and LIN to those under the oine optimal OPT and se-
quential algorithm SEQ. Since OPT requires knowledge about each
realization of the parameters, i.e., the exact renewable generation,
customers’ demand and cost functions at each timeslot, it is not prac-
tically feasible. We simply use this as a lower bound of the social
cost. However, SEQ makes conservative capacity planning decision
about κ rst, and then performs similar to PRED. By comparing
to the cost of SEQ, the benet of joint optimization of capacity
planning on κ and real-time demand response is highlighted.
e social costs of PRED and LIN, shown in Figure 6(a), are no
more than 10% higher compared to the fundamental limit OPT.
Importantly, when the capacity price decreases, the gap between
PRED/LIN and OPT becomes smaller. Since currently the technology
improvements are reducing the capacity price, from Figure 6(a), this
gap will decrease further. e social cost of SEQ increases rapidly
with increasing capacity prices because of the conservative 90kW
capacity used to protect the system from any leover mismatch.
When capacity price increases, all algorithms have higher costs as
expected. However, PRED increases faster than LIN. is is because
LIN starts to rely more on the linear contracts than capacity, so it
becomes more immune to the capacity price increases. is provides
the rst guideline to choose between PRED and LIN in practice. e
second guideline depends on the level of customers’ uncertainties,
and will be discussed soon.
Interestingly, for PRED, LIN, and OPT, the social cost aen when
the price exceeds some threshold. is is because when capacity
price is too high, the LSE would purchase lile capacity, as shown in
Figure 6(b) and pay more to get demand response from customers,
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Figure 7: Comparing the Linear Policy and Price Prediction Schemewith theOline optimal solution and Sequential policy for
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Figure 8: Comparing the annual social cost with dierent
Relative Standard Deviations (RSD) of the customer cost pa-
rameters ai . e cost of capacity was set to $10/kW-mo.
illustrated by Figure 6(c). e downside in the case of PRED, how-
ever, is the increased remaining mismatch that is not balanced by
demand response, as shown in Figure 6(d).
To understand more behind the social costs, Figures 6(b) and
6(c) illustrate the optimal capacities and the amount of demand
response extracted for all algorithms. As the price increases, the
capacities decrease, and the amounts of extracted DR increase to
compensate for the reduced reserve capabilities. Note in Figure 6(b),
PRED always has a higher capacity than OPT because PRED needs
some additional capability to handle the estimation errors. Similarly,
when seing the price, PRED picks a higher price to extract more
demand response on average, as shown in Figure 6(c), to act as a
buer in case some customers’ responses are overestimated. e
increased cost due to uncertainties in PRED compared to OPT can
be considered as a “risk premium”. We will vary the customers’
uncertainties to provide more information in Figure 8.
Impacts of the renewable penetration level. As renewable energy
installation is rapidly growing, we evaluate the impacts of installed
renewable energy capacities. Illustrated by Figure 7, social cost
increases with more renewable energy installed as there is larger
mismatch to be balanced. When the wind capacity is too large,
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Figure 9: e eect of the level of commitment on (a) the
annual social cost and (b) the normalized capacity mismatch
for dierent amounts of Relative Standard Deviations (RSD)
on the customer cost parameter a.
LIN can no longer just rely on the demand response, but needs a
higher capacity, as shown in Figure 7(b). roughout the gures,
our proposed algorithms PRED and LIN perform very closely to the
oine OPT.
Impacts of customer uncertainties. As another key message of
the paper, we investigate the impact of the customer cost function
uncertainties through the parameter ai . Here we x the average
cost parameter E[ai ] and vary the variance of ai .
Figure 8 illustrates the social cost of the algorithms under dif-
ferent relative standard deviations. Interestingly, as the variance
increases, OPT actually has a lower cost. e reason is that since
OPT is the oine solution, it can utilize the realization of each ai (t)
to target the customers with small cost parameters for each timeslot
t . As the variance increases, this targeted set of customers will have
lower parameters, which leads to lower social cost in OPT.
PRED has the same cost as OPT when the variance is 0, but the
gap becomes larger as the variance increases. Unlike the case of in-
creasing uncertainty from larger renewable capacities, the increased
uncertainties due to a larger variance in ai cannot be well handled
by PRED. However, the cost of LIN does not change much. is
suggests the second rule to pick between PRED and LIN: with larger
uncertainties, LIN performs relatively beer.
6.3 Flexible Commitment Demand Response
6.3.1 LIN with flexibility: LIN+(ρ). One potential drawback of
LIN is that customers are forced to follow the specied linear policy
and may from time-to-time face a very high cost to follow the policy.
From the social perspective, it is not benecial to force a customer
under much higher than average costs to provide demand response
as compared to the LSE cost for tolerating more mismatch.
Motivated by this observation and the regulation service pro-
gram described in Section 2, we modify the LIN policy to add some
exibility limited by a single parameter ρ. We call the new algo-
rithm LIN+(ρ). Under LIN+(ρ), each customer has up to 1 − ρ (in
percentage) of the timeslots in which they do not need to follow the
policy according to her realized αi (t). In other words, she may pick
her original di (t) with xi = 0(t) for such timeslots.
A caveat is that we add is to only allow the customers to pick
such timeslots according to their cost functions, e.g., through the
parameters αi (t) regardless of D(t). From the social perspective,
allowing customers with higher αi (t) to violate results in lower
social costs. However if the customers had full freedom, most cus-
tomers would choose to violate when D(t) is high which is when
the LSE needs DR the most. In reality, this condition can be enforced
by calculating Ei [D |i violates] for the timeslots that a particular
customer chooses to violate. If this value is signicantly higher
than E[D], then the customer faces some penalty.
Note that although we add the exibility to LIN in this paper,
the approach is in fact general and can be applied to a wide range
of fully commied programs as follows. Each customer is allowed
to violate her commitment by up to 1 − ρ (in percentage) of the
timeslots. A customer can run a local optimization to decide which
timeslots to violate, while the LSE can add some constraints to align
the local optimization with the social optimization, such as those
described above.
6.3.2 Cost versus mismatch leover tradeo. Now we evaluate
the additional cost savings brought by LIN+(ρ). Figure 9 highlights
the tradeo between cost and mismatch leover that cannot be bal-
anced due to capacity constraints. Recall that there is lile mismatch
leover in LIN, or equivalently, LIN+(1).
Depicted in Figure 9(a), as ρ decreases from 1, the social cost rst
decreases due to the fact that some customers with very high ai (t)
are allowed to not provide demand response. As ρ continues to
decrease, we have more customers not providing demand response
and the cost actually goes up again. is is because the penalty for
the mismatch becomes larger than the costs of customers to provide
demand response.
On the other hand, Figure 9(b) highlights that the mismatch
leover increases with lower ρ as more customers are allowed to
not provide demand response. Importantly, the increase is very
slow at the beginning when we decrease ρ from 1 because there
is enough capacity to handle the small decit in demand response.
However, the social cost decreases a lot. is actually highlights
the great potential to decrease ρ appropriately to achieve a lower
social cost but still have lile mismatch leover. For instance, in our
case study shown in Figure 9, ρ = 0.8 achieves cost savings 7-8%
with less than 1% of mismatch leover. Recall that the gap between
LIN and the oine optimal OPT is about 10%. is means LIN+(ρ∗)
achieves near optimal cost.
7 CONCLUSION
Extracting reliable demand response from customers is crucial to
reduce/defer new energy storage/reserve installation and has signif-
icant environmental benets. However, existing demand response
programs suer from either low participation due to strict commit-
ment, or not being reliable in voluntary programs. Moreover, the
capacity planning for energy storage/reserve is traditionally done
without considering the demand response capabilities, which incurs
ineciencies. Additionally, the uncertainties on the customers costs
in providing demand response receive lile aention in literature.
In this paper, we rst model the problem as a stochastic optimization
problem, and then design two online algorithms, PRED and LIN, to
jointly optimize the capacity and demand response program design.
PRED utilizes historical data to estimate the cost functions, while
LIN is a linear contract between the LSE and customers. We further
design a distributed algorithm with guaranteed convergence for
obtaining the optimal parameters for LIN. In addition, we design a
exible commitment demand response program LIN+(ρ) by adding
exibility to LIN. Numerical simulations highlight the near optimal
performance of the proposed algorithms, and large cost savings
compared to a widely used baseline SEQ especially when capacity
price is not negligible.
Regarding further directions, the most exciting one is to incorpo-
rate power network constraints into our optimization framework.
is will bring some new challenges and insights. In particular, the
parameter βi for the customer’s own prediction error in LIN will
no longer be zero due to the fact that errors can be handled easier
locally because of the loss over power lines and the line capacity
constraints.
8 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
We thank all of the reviewers and our shepherd Shaolei Ren for
their valuable feedback. is research is supported by NSF grants
CNS-1464388 and CNS-1617698.
Harnessing Flexible and Reliable Demand Response Under Customer Uncertainties e-Energy ’17, May 16-19, 2017, Shatin, Hong Kong
REFERENCES
[1] 2013. PJM, Market-Based Regulation [Online]. hp://pjm.com/
markets-and-operations/ancillary-services. (2013).
[2] 2016. CAISO, Base Interruptible Program [Online]. hps://www.pge.
com/en US/business/save-energy-money/energy-management-programs/
demand-response-programs/base-interruptible/base-interruptible.page.
(October 2016).
[3] 2016. CAISO, Demand Bidding Program [Online]. hps://www.pge.
com/en US/business/save-energy-money/energy-management-programs/
demand-response-programs/demand-bidding/demand-bidding.page. (October
2016).
[4] 2016. Department of Energy, e smart grid: an introduction [Online]. hp:
//energy.gov/oe/downloads/smart-grid-introduction-0. (March 2016).
[5] 2016. ERCOT, Demand Response [Online]. hp://www.ercot.com/services/
programs/load. (October 2016).
[6] 2016. Fort Collins Utilities, Coincident peak [Online]. hp://www.fcgov.com/
utilities/business/rates/electric/coincident-peak. (October 2016).
[7] 2016. ISO New England, Daily Generation by Fuel Type [Online]. hps://www.
iso-ne.com/isoexpress/web/reports/operations/-/tree/daily-gen-fuel-type. (Sep-
tember 2016).
[8] 2016. ISO New England, Zonal Information [Online]. hp://www.iso-ne.com/
isoexpress/web/reports/pricing/-/tree/zone-info. (May 2016).
[9] 2016. National Renewable Energy Laboratory, Variability of Renewable Energy
Sources [Online]. hp://www.nrel.gov/electricity/transmission/variability.html.
(April 2016).
[10] 2016. NYISO, Demand Response Programs [Online]. hp://www.nyiso.com/
public/markets operations/market data/demand response/index.jsp. (October
2016).
[11] 2016. US Department of Energry, Grid Integration [Online]. hp://energy.gov/
eere/wind/grid-integration. (April 2016).
[12] D. Aikema, R. Simmonds, and H. Zareipour. 2012. Data centres in the ancillary
services market. In IGCC. 1–10.
[13] Blaise Allaz and Jean-Luc Vila. 1993. Cournot competition, forward markets and
eciency. Journal of Economic theory 59, 1 (1993), 1–16.
[14] Sean Barker, Aditya Mishra, David Irwin, Emmanuel Cecchet, Prashant Shenoy,
and Jeannie Albrecht. 2012. Smart*: An open data set and tools for enabling
research in sustainable homes. SustKDD, August 111 (2012), 112.
[15] Madhur Behl, Francesco Smarra, and Rahul Mangharam. 2016. DR-Advisor: A
data-driven demand response recommender system. Applied Energy 170 (2016),
30–46.
[16] Dimitri P Bertsekas. 1999. Nonlinear programming. Athena scientic Belmont.
[17] Eilyan Bitar, Kameshwar Poolla, Pramod Khargonekar, Ram Rajagopal, Pravin
Varaiya, and Felix Wu. 2012. Selling Random Wind. In System Sciences, Hawaii
International Conference on. IEEE, 1931–1937.
[18] Eilyan Bitar, Ram Rajagopal, Pramod Khargonekar, and Kameshwar Poolla. 2011.
e role of co-located storage for wind power producers in conventional electric-
ity markets. In American Control Conference (ACC). IEEE, 3886–3891.
[19] Stephen Boyd and Mutapic. 2014. Lecture notes on Stochastic Subgradient Meth-
ods. (April 2014).
[20] Stephen Boyd and Jaehyun Park. 2014. Lecture notes on Subgradient Methods.
(May 2014).
[21] S. Boyd and L. Vandenberghe. 2004. Convex Optimization. Combridge University
Press.
[22] Desmond WH Cai and Adam Wierman. 2013. Ineciency in forward markets
with supply friction. In 52nd IEEE Conference on Decision and Control. IEEE,
5594–5599.
[23] H. Chen, M. C. Caramanis, and A. K. Coskun. 2014. e data center as a grid load
stabilizer. In Design Automation Conference (ASP-DAC), IEEE 19th Asia and South
Pacic. 105–112.
[24] Hao Chen, Zhenhua Liu, Ayse K Coskun, and Adam Wierman. 2015. Optimizing
energy storage participation in emerging power markets. In Green Computing
Conference and Sustainable Computing Conference (IGSC), 2015 Sixth International.
IEEE, 1–6.
[25] Brian K. Cherry. 2013. Electric Schedule E-CBP. Technical Report. Pacic Gas and
Electric Company.
[26] M. Chowdhury, M. Rao, Y. Zhao, T. Javidi, and A. Goldsmith. 2016. Benets of
storage control for wind power producers in power markets. to appear in IEEE
Transactions on Sustainable Energy (2016).
[27] Federal Energy Regulatory Commission 2010. FERC-731 Demand Response/Time-
Based Rate Programs and Advanced Metering instructions. Federal Energy Regula-
tory Commission.
[28] NIST Framework. 2010. Roadmap for Smart Grid Interoperability Standards,
Release 1.0 (Jan. 2010)(NIST Special Publication 1108). (January 2010).
[29] Zwe-Lee Gaing. 2003. Particle swarm optimization to solving the economic
dispatch considering the generator constraints. IEEE transactions on power systems
18, 3 (2003), 1187–1195.
[30] Pavithra Harsha, Mukesh Sharma, Ramesh Natarajan, and Sudip Ghosh. 2013.
A framework for the analysis of probabilistic demand response schemes. Smart
Grid, IEEE Transactions on 4, 4 (2013), 2274–2284.
[31] Gabriela Hug. 2012. Generation cost and system risk trade-o with corrective
power ow control. In Communication, Control, and Computing (Allerton), 2012
50th Annual Allerton Conference on. IEEE, 1324–1331.
[32] ISO new england 2011. Demand Resource (DR) User Interface Guide (RL.2 ed.). ISO
new england.
[33] Libin Jiang and Steven Low. 2011. Multi-period optimal energy procurement and
demand response in smart grid with uncertain supply. In Decision and Control
and European Control Conference. IEEE, 4348–4353.
[34] Brendan J Kirby. 2005. Frequency regulation basics and trends. United States.
Department of Energy.
[35] Fabian Laforet, Erik Buchmann, and Klemens Bo¨hm. 2016. Towards provable
privacy guarantees using rechargeable energy-storage devices. In Proceedings of
the Seventh International Conference on Future Energy Systems. ACM, 7.
[36] Na Li, Lijun Chen, and Steven H Low. 2011. Optimal demand response based on
utility maximization in power networks. In 2011 IEEE power and energy society
general meeting. IEEE, 1–8.
[37] Zhenhua Liu, Iris Liu, Steven Low, and Adam Wierman. 2014. Pricing data center
demand response. ACM SIGMETRICS Performance Evaluation Review 42, 1 (2014),
111–123.
[38] Steven H Low. 2014. Convex relaxation of optimal power ow, part I: Formulations
and equivalence. arXiv preprint arXiv:1405.0766 (2014).
[39] Frederic Murphy and Yves Smeers. 2010. On the impact of forward markets on
investments in oligopolistic markets with reference to electricity. Operations
research 58, 3 (2010), 515–528.
[40] New York Independent System Operator 2013. Emergency Demand Response
Program Manual (7.1 ed.). New York Independent System Operator, Rensselaer,
NY.
[41] JH Park, YS Kim, IK Eom, and KY Lee. 1993. Economic load dispatch for piecewise
quadratic cost function using Hopeld neural network. IEEE Transactions on
Power Systems 8, 3 (1993), 1030–1038.
[42] Carla J. Peterman. 2013. R. 10-12-007 COM/CAP/jv1. California Public Utilities
Commission (October 2013).
[43] P. Pinson. 2013. Wind energy: Forecasting challenges for its operational manage-
ment. Statist. Sci. 28, 4 (2013), 564–585.
[44] Laurynas Sˇiksˇnys and Torben Bach Pedersen. 2016. Dependency-based FlexOers:
scalable management of exible loads with dependencies. In Proceedings of the
Seventh International Conference on Future Energy Systems. ACM, 11.
[45] Ken Silverstein. 2013. California’s New Energy Storage Mandate Under the
Microscope. Online, EnergyBiz (October 2013). hp://www.energybiz.com/
article/13/10/california-s-new-energy-storage-mandate-under-microscope.
[46] Nancy Skinner. 2010. Assembly Bill No. 2514. California State Assembly (Septem-
ber 2010).
[47] John S. Vardakas, Nizar Zorba, and Christos V. Verikoukis. 2015. A Survey on
Demand Response Programs in Smart Grids: Pricing Methods and Optimization
Algorithms. IEEE Communcation Suverys Tutorials 17, 1 (2015), 152–178.
[48] Adam Wierman, Zhenhua Liu, Iris Liu, and Hamed Mohsenian-Rad. 2014. Op-
portunities and challenges for data center demand response. In Green Computing
Conference (IGCC), 2014 International. IEEE, 1–10.
[49] Tri Kurniawan Wijaya, Maeo Vasirani, and Karl Aberer. 2014. When bias maers:
An economic assessment of demand response baselines for residential customers.
IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid 5, 4 (2014), 1755–1763.
[50] Jian Yao, Shmuel S Oren, and Ilan Adler. 2007. Two-selement electricity markets
with price caps and Cournot generation rms. european journal of operational
research 181, 3 (2007), 1279–1296.
[51] Changhong Zhao and Steven Low. 2014. Optimal decentralized primary frequency
control in power networks. In 53rd IEEE Conference on Decision and Control. IEEE,
2467–2473.
[52] Jing Zhao, Taeho Jung, Yu Wang, and Xiangyang Li. 2014. Achieving dierential
privacy of data disclosure in the smart grid. In INFOCOM, 2014 Proceedings IEEE.
IEEE, 504–512.
[53] Yue Zhao, Junjie Qin, Ram Rajagopal, Andrea Goldsmith, and H Vincent Poor.
2015. Wind aggregation via risky power markets. Power Systems, IEEE Transactions
on 30, 3 (2015), 1571–1581.
APPENDIX
A KARUSH-KUHN-TUCKER CONDITIONS
Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions for optimality of x(t) at time
t in Problem (6) are:
C ′i (x∗i (t)) −C ′g
©­«D(t) −
∑
j ∈V
x∗j (t)
ª®¬ + θ∗ − θ∗ = 0, ∀i ∈ V (17a)
θ∗ ©­«D(t) −
∑
j ∈V
x∗j (t) + κ
ª®¬ = 0 (17b)
θ
∗ ©­«D(t) −
∑
j ∈V
x∗j (t) − κ
ª®¬ = 0 (17c)
θ∗ ≥ 0, θ∗ ≥ 0 (17d)
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− κ ≤ D(t) −
∑
j ∈V
x∗j (t) ≤ κ (17e)
where (θ ,θ ) are the dual variables for the constraint (6b), (17a)
are the rst-order stationary conditions, (17c) and (17b) are the
complementary slackness conditions, (17d) are the dual feasibility
conditions, and (17e) are the primal feasibility conditions.
To beer understand the physical implications of these condi-
tions, we start from (17b) and (17c). When the constraint (17e) onκ is
non-binding, i.e., −κ < D(t)−∑j ∈V x∗j (t) < κ, we have θ∗ = θ∗ = 0.
en (17a) implies C ′i (x∗i (t)) = C ′g
(
D(t) −∑j ∈V x∗j (t)) , meaning
that the marginal cost for each customer to provide demand re-
sponse is the same, all of which is equal to the LSE’s marginal cost
to tolerate the mismatch.
e KKT condition of optimality for capacity κ in Problem (5) is:
C ′cap(κ∗) +
∂
∂κ
Eδi ,δr
[
R(κ∗; t)] = 0 (18)
where R(κ; t) is the optimal value of Problem (6). We can inter-
change the derivative operator and expectation operator if either of
the following conditions are true: (i) (δi ,δr ) are from continuous
probability distributions and R(κ; t) is continuously dierentiable
for all (δi ,δr ) (from the Leibniz Integral Rule); (ii) (δi ,δr ) are from
discrete probability distributions (dierentiation is a linear operator).
is results in the following:
C ′cap(κ∗) + Eδi ,δr
[
∂
∂κ
R(κ∗; t)
]
= 0 (19)
From Lemma 4.3, the negative of the sum of the dual variables
θ +θ for constraint (6b) is the gradient of R(κ; t) w.r.t. κ. is allows
us to substitute θ∗ + θ∗ for the partial derivative:
C ′cap(κ∗) = Eδi ,δr
[
θ (κ∗; t)] (20)
where we use the notation of θ (κ; t) as a function to represent the
sum of the optimal dual variables θ∗ + θ∗ from the KKT conditions
(17) for given (κ; t).
B PROOFS
Proof of Theorem 5. (Based on [20] and [16] Chapter 6.) At
iteration k , let Λ(k ) := (pi (k),λ(k ), µ(k)) be the current dual prices,
Q(Λ(k )) be the partial dual function value of (12), G(k ) be the sub-
gradient of the dual function, and η(k ) be the step size. Also note
that the subgradient at iteration k for constraint (12b) is G(k ) :=
(α (k ), β (k ),γ (k )) − (u(k ), v(k),w(k )).
Start with the squared Euclidean distance between the iteration
(k + 1) and optimal dual price vectors and substitute Λ(k+1) with
the dual price update in Equation (16):
| |Λ(k+1) − Λ∗ | |22 = | |Λ(k) + η(k )G(k ) − Λ∗ | |22 . (21)
Expanding out the terms on the RHS becomes:
| |Λ(k+1) − Λ∗ | |22
= | |Λ(k) − Λ∗ | |22 − 2η(k )G(k)T(Λ∗ − Λ(k)) + (η(k ))2 | |G(k ) | |22 . (22)
e rst-order condition of the subgradient is G(k )T(Λ∗ − Λ(k )) ≥
Q(Λ∗) −Q(Λ(k )) which when applied to the equation above gives
us:
| |Λ(k+1) − Λ∗ | |22
≤ ||Λ(k ) − Λ∗ | |22 − 2η(k )(Q(Λ∗) −Q(Λ(k ))) + (η(k ))2 | |G(k ) | |22 . (23)
Apply the above inequality recursively from iteration k to 1 which
results in:
| |Λ(k+1) − Λ∗ | |22
≤ ||Λ(1) − Λ∗ | |22 − 2
k∑
i=1
η(i)(Q(Λ∗) −Q(Λ(i))) +
k∑
i=1
(η(i))2 | |G(i) | |22 .
(24)
Since | |Λ(k+1) − Λ∗ | |22 ≥ 0, then the LHS of the above inequality
is lower bounded by zero and the middle term of the RHS can be
brought to the other side:
2
k∑
i=1
η(i)(Q(Λ∗)−Q(Λ(i))) ≤ ||Λ(1)−Λ∗ | |22+
k∑
i=1
(η(i))2 | |G(i) | |22 . (25)
Let us dene Q(Λ(k )best) := maxi=1, ...,k Q(Λ(i)) as the best dual value
so far in k iterations. is gives a new lower bound to the LHS of
the above inequality and allows the summation to be factored out:
2(Q(Λ∗) −Q(Λ(k )best))
k∑
i=1
η(i) ≤ ||Λ(1) − Λ∗ | |22 +
k∑
i=1
(η(i))2 | |G(i) | |22 .
(26)
and can be brought to the RHS:
Q(Λ∗) −Q(Λ(k )best) ≤
||Λ(1) − Λ∗ | |22 +
∑k
i=1(η(i))2 | |G(i) | |22
2
∑k
i=1 η
(i) . (27)
Apply the denition of the step size η(i) := ζ /i| |G (i ) | |2 from (15) which
turns the above inequality into:
Q(Λ∗) −Q(Λ(k )best) ≤
||Λ(1) − Λ∗ | |22 + ζ 2
∑k
i=1 1/i2
2ζ
∑k
i=1
1/i
| |G (i ) | |2
. (28)
e Assumptions 4 and 5 give an upper bound on the RHS on the
above inequality and allows G to be factored out:
Q(Λ∗) −Q(Λ(k)best) ≤ G
Λ
2
+ ζ 2
∑k
i=1 1/i2
2ζ
∑k
i=1 1/i
. (29)
Taking the limit as number of iterations k approaches innity makes
the RHS approach zero. Also since the LHS is lower bounded by zero,
this results in the best dual value converging to the optimal dual
value. Since dual the functionQ(Λ) is continuous, then lim
k→∞
Λ
(k )
best =
Λ∗. 
In ensuring the existence of the optimal solution to (12), we state
the following theorem.
Denition B.1. e prices (pi ,λ, µ), LSE DR seings
(α , β,γ ), and customer DR seings (u, v,w) are in equilibrium if:
(i) (α , β,γ ) are optimal to (14) with prices (pi ,λ, µ), (ii) For all i ∈
V: (ui ,vi ,wi ) are optimal to (13) with prices (pii , λi , µi ), and (iii)
(α , β,γ ) = (u, v,w).
Theorem B.2. ere exists a set of equilibrium prices (pi ,λ, µ), LSE
DR seings (α , β ,γ ), and customer DR seings (u, v,w). Additionally,
the set is optimal to (12).
Proof. If one takes the Lagrangian of (12), it can be noticed that
it equals the sum of LSE’s Lagrangian of (14) and all the customers’
Lagrangians of (13). Also, the set of primal feasible solutions of
(12) is a subset of primal feasible solutions of (14) and (13) for each
customer i . Additionally, the dual feasible set and complementary
slackness constraints coming from (3a)(3b) applies to both (12) and
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(14). erefore a solution that satises the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker
(KKT) conditions of (12) also simultaneously satises the KKT con-
ditions of (14) and (13), with the condition that (α , β,γ ) = (u, v,w).
An equilibrium point from Denition B.1 must also satisfy KKT con-
ditions of (14) and (13), with the condition that (α , β,γ ) = (u, v,w).
Since (12),(14), and (13) are convex optimization problems, the KKT
conditions are both necessary and sucient for optimality. Since
there clearly exists an optimal point of (12), then there must exist
an equilibrium point. It can be checked that the KKT conditions of
(14) and (13), along with (α , β,γ ) = (u, v,w) are equivalent to the
KKT conditions of (12). erefore an equilibrium point is optimal
to (12). 
